Two Levels of Moral Thinking 1 by Daniel Star
4




The purpose of this paper is to introduce a two-level account of moral
thinking that, unlike other accounts, does justice to three very plausible
propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad:
(1) People can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy.
(2) Morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and
work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering
such reasons.
(3) Philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are not
wasting their time when they search after highly general moral prin-
ciples which could not be discovered or justiﬁably accepted through
non-philosophical thinking, and which specify the good reasons on
which virtuous people act, as well as provide a criterion or criteria for
determining what it is that people ought to do.
The ﬁrst of these claims is attractive because it is important to avoid an
odious philosophical elitism which would have it that only philosophers
can hope to be good people.
2 The second is a highly attractive idea that
1 I would like to thank Stephen Kearns, Mark Timmons, and the originally anonymous
referees, Michael Ridge and Christian Miller, for their very useful feedback, as well as all the
people in the audience at the First Annual Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics, and in
audiences elsewhere, who provided me with suggestions and criticisms.
2 Despite much recent skepticism regarding the virtues, which has its origins especially in
certain ﬁndings in social psychology, the ideal of virtue remains attractive. I believe that, at
most, this skepticism undermines certain traditional accounts of the virtues, rather than
contemporary theories that do not set the bar for moral virtue too high, and that appreciate
that the virtues are commonly fragmented, fragile, and lacking in the type of unity that the
traditional doctrine of the unity of the virtues supposes them to possess (see Adams, 2006, for
an excellent example of such a contemporary theory).goes back to Aristotle: virtuous people are not unaware of the moral
reasons for which they act, and are not only luckily getting things right;
rather, a virtuous person does the right thing for the right reason. The
third claim seems highly attractive because normative ethics appears to
be a valuable research program where we are making genuine, if slow,
progress in articulating and defending fundamental moral principles,
which are not only such that we could not have begun by thinking of
them as obviously true, but which clearly possess a degree of intellectual
sophistication or complexity that is only possible to achieve and place
trust in after extended philosophical reﬂection.
3
These three highly plausible claims appear to give rise to an inconsist-
ency because it seems that if (1) and (2) are true then (3) must be false:
either the virtuous cannot non-accidentally act on genuine moral rea-
sons—because we will only know these reasons when we do philosophy
and discover the non-obvious principles that tell us what our genuine
moral reasons for action are—or we do not need philosophy to discover
the correct moral principles, for the virtuous can already know them.
4
3 I do not mean to deny that it is possible to stumble across sophisticated moral principles
and understandthem.However, whatwe lookfor in normativeethicsis notmereacquaintance
with some such principles, but good reasons to believe them. And I am assuming throughout
that it is not necessary for us to be concerned with cases of people coming to know
fundamental moral principles through testimony, since such cases, assuming they are possible
(some philosophers have argued that it is a special feature of moral knowledge that this is not
possible), would all require that some people know the fundamental moral principles in a way
that is not based on testimony.
4 Another option is to deny that there are any true and non-obvious moral principles
waiting to be discovered, which is to deny (3) (see, for example, Dancy, 2006). I will say
something about particularism in the last section of the paper. Not everyone will think that the
apparent inconsistency of the three central claims constitutes a problem, because not everyone
will ﬁnd all three claims attractive, but I hope a great many people will do so. It is a very
interesting question how W. D. Ross’s pluralist deontology (as outlined in Ross, 2003,
pp. 16–64), which purposely stays very close to common-sense morality, should be interpreted
in relation to (3), but I do not have space to provide a completely adequate response to that
question here. Sufﬁce it to say, one might very naturally take Ross to be denying (3), insomuch
as it can seem like he is not offering up new (justiﬁcation for) moral principles at all, so long as
one focuses on: (i) his claim that it is impossible to provide principles that specify what we
ought to do when prima facie duties conﬂict and (ii) his descriptions of particular prima facie
duties, which are such that they correspond very closely to moral duties or reasons recognized
by ordinary, non-philosophical moral thinking. On such a reading there is not much left for us
to do in normative ethics, in relation to questions about the fundamental principles of
morality, at least, and (1) and (2) seem straightforwardly correct. This is not to say that
deontological theories that take their inspiration from Ross (or someone inspired by much
of the rich abstract theorizing that one also ﬁnds in Ross’s work) need accept (i) and (ii), nor
need necessarily reject (3).
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suggest that we need to adopt a particular way of thinking about virtue,
as well as a particular two-level account of reasons. Each of these is
independently attractive, quite apart from the role they can play
together in avoiding the problem that I have just described. Although
this paper is intended to be schematic—leaving much detailed work still
to be done—it should at least become clear here how adopting these
accounts of virtue and reasons might enable us to avoid the apparent
inconsistency in the above triad of claims, and also put us in a good
position to identify which types of moral statement are good candidates
for knowledge prior to philosophical reﬂection, and which are good
candidates for knowledge only after philosophical reﬂection. I will end
by tentatively exploring the possibility that the account of reasons
I favor might be well placed to capture the grain of truth in particular-
ism, while the account of virtue I favor might be well placed to capture
the grain of truth in moral relativism.
Throughout, I intend to be completely neutral with respect to
debates between the main theoretical options in normative ethics.
My guiding belief is simply that, given the state of contemporary
ethics, we have good reason to think that whether the correct moral
theory is consequentialist or not (deontological or not, and so on),
it will be a theory that is intellectually sophisticated and non-obvious,
from a non-philosophical perspective, in many of its fundamental
details.
5
2. hare and williams on two levels of moral thinking
A good place to begin is with an interesting exchange between R. M.
Hare and Bernard Williams concerning the account of two levels of
moral thinking outlined in Hare’s Moral Thinking (1981). The book
begins by distinguishing between an ‘intuitive’ level and a ‘critical’ level
of moral thinking. On the ﬁrst level, we are said to follow various simple
5 One reason why I think this is that I believe there is growing consensus that the correct
theory will not be too distant from common-sense morality in its prescriptions. I believe that
hedonistic act-utilitarianism is too distant from common-sense morality to ultimately become
a theory that any of us could end up believing with sufﬁcient epistemic justiﬁcation, since there
is no good epistemic route from here to there.
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everyday situations that we encounter. On the second level, it is said
to be appropriate to take an impartial utilitarian perspective and assess
the prima facie rules themselves, and revise them when necessary, as well
as attempt to work out what to do when they conﬂict or otherwise
provide inadequate guidance. In order to make good decisions about
which rules to endorse on the critical level (rules that may sometimes be
very limited in scope), Hare claims that it is necessary to survey the
preferences of every person that will be affected by particular actions,
placing oneself in the position of each of these people in turn.
Hare recognizes that this is an ideal that we can only ever hope to
imperfectly approach, rather than completely realize. He distinguishes
between the ideal types of ‘proles’ and ‘archangels’; the former make
moral decisions only on an intuitive level—if they make good decisions
in a reliable fashion, this is only because they have received a good
education from others who are more critical—while the latter only ever
make decisions that are based on an accurate view of all of the con-
sequences of any of the actions that are available to them. Actual human
beings all fall somewhere between these two extremes (Hare, 1981,p .45).
Williams expressed a number of concerns about this account of moral
thinking in ‘The Structure of Hare’s Theory’ (1988). Noting that Hare’s
account of the two levels of moral thinking is somewhat like Sidgwick’s,
Williams contends that it improves upon Sidgwick’s account by avoid-
ing the arguably odious ‘Government House utilitarianism’ that would
have it that there are two classes of people—an elite class who apply the
correct ethical theory to particular practical issues, and a class of com-
moners who are (best kept) ignorant of the correct theory (Williams,
1988,p .188). Nonetheless, Hare is said to inherit from Sidgwick a fatal
tension in his account of the two levels of moral thinking: the intuitive
level is meant to correspond to ordinary non-philosophical moral
judgments; however, ‘the more the theory represents the intuitive reactions
as merely superﬁcial, provisional, and instrumental, the fewer
appearances it saves: it does not explain what people do feel and think,
but suggests something else in the same area thatthey might usefully feel
and think’ (1988,p .190, my italics). This sounds right, but it is not
obvious what the best approach to saving the appearances is, once we
give up on Hare’s approach. I attempt to provide an alternative
approach below. In any case, Williams argues that ordinary agents are
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limited extent Hare contends that they are, and that ordinary agents are
not generally inclined to accept the sometimes radical revisions to the
prima facie rules that they hold dear which utilitarianism would have
them undergo.
I believe Hare’s failure to give an account of the intuitive level of
moral thinking that actually lines up with and appropriately explains
our ordinary moral judgments is connected to two other closely related
aspects of Hare’s project: his explicit rejection of any reliance on
particular substantive moral judgments in his basic methodology, in
favor of instead appealing only to formal conditions said to be required
for the proper use of moral language; and his failure to provide any
space within his project for legitimate claims about moral knowledge,
despite he himself suggesting that his project has knowledge as its aim.
First, with respect to his methodology, Hare (1981,p .12) writes:
The appeal to moral intuitions will never do as a basis for a moral system. It is
certainly possible, as some thinkers...have done, to collect all the moral
opinions of which they and their contemporaries feel most sure, ﬁnd some
relatively simple method or apparatus which can be represented...as generat-
ing all these opinions; and then pronounce that that is the moral system we
must acknowledge to be the correct one. But they have absolutely no authority
for this claim beyond the original convictions, for which no ground or argu-
ment was given. The ‘equilibrium’ they have reached is one which might have
been generated by prejudice, and no amount of reﬂection can make that a solid
basis for morality.
For Hare, utilitarianism itself is to be justiﬁed not through reﬂection on
our moral intuitions, but through observing, and thinking about what
follows from features that are necessary for the proper use of moral
language (universalizability and prescriptivity). It seems to most of us
now that such formal linguistic conditions cannot play the substantive
normative role that Hare wanted them to play (I take it that this is
the general consensus). Hare’s attempt to ground the fundamental
principle of normative ethics on prescriptivity and universalizability
alone, while heroic, can be challenged both with respect to the relevant
claims about what the necessary features of moral language are, and,
more crucially than this, with respect to the steps that lead from these
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particular.
In any case, Hare’s rejection of any reliance on the substantive moral
judgments that make up our ‘original convictions’ takes for granted that
these judgments are likely to have been generated by prejudice (to be
fair, he says ‘might have been generated by prejudice’, but the tone of
the above quotation is one of damning skepticism). This is already to
cast ﬁrst-level moral thinking in a very weak role indeed, and the
argument against (reﬂective) ‘equilibrium’ (which clearly has Rawls in
mind) ignores the possibility that the process that leads to such equilib-
rium might be better thought of as one that builds on knowledge rather
than on mere opinions.
It is telling that the epigraph to Hare’s book is the following quota-
tion from Plato (Meno, 98b; Hare, 1981,p .1): ‘And truly I too speak as
one who knows not—only guesses. But that there is a difference in kind
between right opinion and knowledge, this, it seems to me, I do not
guess; but of the few things, if any, that I would claim to know, this is
one.’ This is an intriguing choice of epigraph because Hare, in fact,
has very little to say about knowledge in his book. In particular, there
does not seem to be any room in the theory outlined therein for moral
knowledge. When he does speak of knowledge he is concerned with
knowledge of people’s preferences (and he then speaks of ‘...the sense
of “know” that moral thinking demands’, 1981,p .96), not with know-
ledge of what people ought to do. We are expected to leave behind our
ordinary moral opinions and come to see that prescriptivism is correct,
and that the most sensible prescription (one that fully appreciates the
universalizability feature of moral language) is ultimately going to be
a purely utilitarian prescription, which is not truth-apt.
6 That is all
6 Michael Ridge has pointed out to me that in saying this I might be accused of misstating
Hare’s view, since in ‘Some Confusions about Subjectivity’, originally published in 1976, Hare
writes: ‘We can use the words “right” and “wrong” when speaking of moral statements that
people have made. Some opponents of non-descriptivism have made a great deal of play with
this fact, as they have with the similar fact that we also use the words “true” and “false”, in
certain contexts, of moralstatements. But there is no reason why a non-descriptivist should not
readily admit that these words are used in speaking of moral statements, provided at any rate
that he is prepared, as most non-descriptivists have been since Stevenson, to allow that moral
statements do have, as one element in their meaning, what is usually called “descriptive
meaning”...For it may be this element to which we are adverting when we call a moral
statement true or false.’ (Hare, 1989,p .26). Ridge believes that Hare and Stevenson here
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room to claim that we could ever come to know any moral claims, let
alone know that we ought to (adopt prima facie rules that) impartially
maximize utility.
Hare’s Platonic rejection of any reliance on ordinary, substantive
moral judgments (mere ‘opinion’) goes hand in hand with his adoption
of a normative ethical theory that conﬂicts with such judgments to too
great an extent. I would like to suggest at this point that it is only by
construing a class of ﬁrst-level judgments as examples of unreﬂective
knowledge that we can both make sense of the appearances, so far as
ordinary agents are concerned (Star, 2008), and make sense of the
project of normative ethics, since this project can be most plausibly
construed as one that is guided by an ideal of knowledge of fundamental
moral principles that builds on pre-philosophical knowledge. (If we
assume that a purely coherentist account of epistemic justiﬁcation is
not an option, then it is important that we start with some moral
knowledge.) Hare’s particular failure should not lead us to conclude
that normative ethics—construed as a philosophical enterprise that
aims to discover highly general and non-obvious explanatory moral
principles—is a hopeless project (contra Williams).
Various moral theories, whether consequentialist or deontological,
may be compatible with those of our ﬁrst-level moral judgments that are
good candidates for knowledge, insofar as they are compatible with
certain core judgments regarding right and wrong action (that it is
always wrong to torture someone merely for fun, for example), and
certain core judgments regarding normative reasons (for example, that
there is always some reason to be kind to people wherever possible, and
anticipated certain elements of quasi-realism. That may be so, and quasi-realists may certainly
have sophisticated things to say about moral knowledge (and I see no obvious reason to think
my own account of moral thinking would be inconsistent with such sophisticated quasi-
realism).However, to say, as Hare does, that just partof a moralstatement is truth-aptis a long
way from saying that the whole of a moral statement is truth-apt, and knowing the descriptive
meaning component of a moral statement (on the assumption that one is attempting to follow
Hare’s outmoded way of distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive meanings) is
a long way from knowing the moral statement as a whole. The last may be impossible if part of
the statement is essentially prescriptive and a different part of the statement is essentially
descriptive. In any case, it is not at all clear what the descriptive meaning component of the
fundamental utilitarian principle actually is, or whether that principle would even have very
much descriptive content, assuming prescriptivism were correct.
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ism does not fall into this category—that is, it may be the case that
Williams is right that utilitarianism is too revisionary—but this should
not deter us from developing better consequentialist or deontological
theories that might better ﬁt together with our most fundamental ﬁrst-
level moral judgments (and, ultimately, coming to rationally judge that
one particular theory is correct).
3. two levels of normative reasons
I believe that in order to successfully develop a more satisfactory two-
level account of moral thinking, it is necessary to: (1) provide an account
of reasons that divides reasons into two types: those that the folk can
non-accidentally follow, and those that philosophers can discover (and,
ideally, come to know); (2) provide an adequate explanation of how
these two types of reasons are related; and (3) provide a plausible
account of virtue according to which being minimally virtuous
will depend only on ﬁrst-level thinking—that is, thinking about and
responding to ﬁrst-level reasons. Achieving the ﬁrst task will enable us to
avoid odious elitism and establish a more attractive division of labor
between the folk and moral philosophers, and achieving the third task
will place virtue squarely with the folk. The second task is also crucial,
because it is one thing to posit two categories of reasons, and quite
another to avoid the appearance of simply trying to have one’s cake and
eat it too. In this section I will attempt to undertake the ﬁrst two tasks,
and in the next section I will attempt to undertake the third task.
The new account of reasons that I hope will enable us to achieve these
tasks has at its heart a uniﬁed and informative analysis of normative
reasons that has been argued for by myself and Stephen Kearns else-
where (Kearns and Star, 2008, 2009, forthcoming). We call this analysis
reasons as evidence. It can be stated as follows:
 R: Necessarily, a fact F is a reason for an agent A to çif and only if
F is evidence that A ought to ç.
This analysis of reasons explains what it is for a fact to be a reason in
terms of that fact being evidence for the truth of an ought proposition.
In the case of reasons for belief, ç is to be replaced by ‘believe P’, and
with respect to normal, purely non-pragmatic reasons for belief, the fact
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believe P just because it is evidence that P.
An example might aid in understanding R, as it applies to reasons for
action. Imagine that you are hurrying to meet a friend, Jed, who you
promised to meet in a few minutes for coffee, and you come across a sick
stranger who needs your assistance to get to a hospital, and it is apparent
to you that providing such assistance will take quite a bit of time (so it is
not possible to both help the stranger and keep your promise to Jed).
A natural way of describing your decision to help the stranger (if that is
the decision you would make) is to say that you recognize that there is
a reason to meet your friend and a reason to help the stranger, and you
judge that the reason to help the stranger is a stronger reason than the
reason to meet your friend. Another natural way of describing your
situation is to say that you recognize that there is evidence that you
ought to meet your friend and evidence that you ought to help the
stranger, and you judge that the evidence that you ought to help the
stranger is stronger than the evidence that you ought to meet your
friend. Reasons as evidence has it that the relevant claims about evidence
and reasons are (extensionally) equivalent.
We can speak, as I just did, of it being the case that there ‘is’ a reason,
just as we can speak of it being the case that there ‘is’ evidence. Similarly,
we can speak of it being the case that a person ‘has’ a reason, just as we
can speak of it being the case that a person ‘has’ evidence. If a stranger
outside my front door urgently needs my help but I am inside and
unaware of that fact, there is still a reason for me to help the stranger
(there is evidence that I ought to help the stranger), but this is not
a reason (evidence)that Ipossess. Of course, there may be constraints on
which facts can count as unpossessed evidence, and these constraints
will also be constraints on unpossessed reasons. Plausibly, a fact F can
only be evidence for me that P if an idealized counterpart of myself
would have this evidence (that is, be aware of F and recognize that it is
evidencethat P).Insteadof R, one couldinstead choose to initiallyfocus
on the following claim: A has a reason to ç and that reason is F iff A has
evidence that he ought to ç and that evidence is F. One could then
deﬁne what it is to be evidence that one ought to ç as follows: F is
evidence that A ought to ç iff an appropriately idealized counterpart of
A would have evidence that he ought to ç, and that evidence would
include F. Finally, one could specify what it is for there to be a reason
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evidence that A ought to ç. I will not attempt to say anything here about
what kind of idealization is most appropriate for this account of reasons,
but that is certainly something that would be worth thinking about.
According to R, all reasons for action are evidence that I ought to do
something in particular. Going beyond this core analysis, we might
additionally suppose that some of the facts that are reasons also play an
ultimate right-making role (or wrong-making role); they make it the case
that particular acts are right (or wrong). These ultimate reasons would
be the reasons that we aim to specify in normative ethical theories, along
with universal principles concerning what we ought to do.
Suppose, for the sake of a simple example, that the correct moral
theory is hedonistic utilitarianism (needless to say, I do not actually
think this is the correct moral theory). This theory would have it that
the only ultimate reasons are facts about pain and pleasure. If an act
would increase pleasure in the world then the fact that this act would
increase pleasure is an ultimate reason to do it, while if an act would
increase pain in the world then the fact that this act would increase pain
is an ultimate reason not to do it. Furthermore, one ought to do those
acts that increase the balance of pleasure over pain (according to the
theory). Now consider the fact that a particular act is a lie. This
normative theory says nothing about facts that are lies. However, the
fact that this act is a lie is evidence that one ought not do it, and is thus
also a derivative reason not to do it. What ultimately makes it (reliable)
evidence that one ought not lie, assuming it is, is that it is generally true
that lying leads to an increase in pain.
Of course, discovering ultimate reasons will be no simple task, but we
are all familiar with derivative reasons; that is, on the present account of
reasons, mundane evidence concerning what we ought to do (and ought
not do). Plausibly, it is by thinking carefully and systematically about
this mundane evidence (amongst other things) that philosophers are
able to develop good ethical theories that provide us with deep explan-
ations of what is right and wrong. The direction of explanation seems to
be the reverse of the direction of discovery—ultimate reasons explain
derivative reasons, but it is only through ﬁrst encountering derivative
reasons that we are able to discover ultimate reasons. Furthermore, we
may be in a position to know what our (good) evidence is; if that is so,
we are in a position to knowingly respond to our (derivative) reasons.
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(minimally) virtuous ﬁnd themselves.
Toillustrateusingtheaboveexample:ontheassumptionthatutilitar-
ianism is true (contrary to what I actually think), a virtuous agent might
justiﬁablyrecognizethattherearereasonsnottolie,evenwhentheyhave
never heard of, let alone have thought carefully about, utilitarianism;
they would be able to do this because they are able to recognize ordinary
evidence that they ought not lie (the fact that it upsets people when they
discoverthattheyhavebeentoldalie,orthefactthattheythemselvesfeel
badwhen theyhavebeen liedto,to useacoupleof superﬁcialexamples).
Such evidence might itself be an input into a subsequent attempt to
discover the correct normative ethical theory, even though it would not
ultimately play a role in the spelling out of that theory.
I believe that only reasons as evidence can explain how it is that the
direction of explanation can be the reverse of the direction of discovery
in the way I have just described. At least, this seems to be the only
account of reasons that might hope to do so in a way that is true to the
appearances, so far as the moral reasons we encounter in our ordinary
lives are concerned, at the same time as providing room for there to be
the ultimate reasons that sophisticated ﬁrst-order moral theories would
posit. In particular, it can hope to do this in a way that is promising
when we think about moral epistemology: a crucial challenge for
alternative accounts of reasons is to explain how it is that we can
know, or be justiﬁed in following, derivate reasons, without possessing
any knowledge of ultimate reasons. Reasons as evidence does not hide the
key to this puzzle:we can startoff being awareof reasons, in virtue of the
fact that we start off with evidence concerning what it is that we ought
to do, and these reasons, as evidence, come ready to also lead us to
deeper knowledge through reﬂection.
Admittedly, I have not surveyed alternative accounts of reasons here.
I can only quickly provide a criticism that will apply to a large and
popular class of such accounts. A popular idea is to think of a normative
reason as being at least part of an explanation: it might, for instance, be
part of an explanation of why one ought to do a particular act, or an
explanation of why an act is desirable.
7 The problem with accounts of
7 John Broome defends a sophisticated version of the ﬁrst view (for extensive commentary
on Broome,see Kearnsand Star, 2008), and Sean McKeever and Michael Ridge are developing
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in practical reasoning that normative reasons play. I take it that two
truisms about normative reasons are: (1) that they are typically weighed
against each other; and (2) that they are typically inputs, rather than
outputs, in pieces of practical reasoning. In relation to both (1) and (2),
reasons contrast with oughts—both of these claims are not true of
oughts, since judgments about what one ought to do typically come
as conclusions in practical reasoning. In any case, reasons are typically
upstream of oughts. Explanans, however, are typically downstream
of explanandum, in the sense that one starts with something to be
explained and then looks for ways in which it might be explained.
In practical reasoning, one cannot start with explanations of something
one ought to do, because by paying attention to reasons one is trying to
work out what one ought to do! On the other hand, reasons as evidence
ﬁts together very well with (1) and (2).
One might be tempted to respond to this criticism of explanation-
based accounts of normative reasons by saying the following: the facts
that are reasons in virtue of playing an explanatory role can play the
right kind of role in practical reasoning without being appreciated or
understood as (parts of) explanations by agents engaged in practical
reasoning.
8 However, I see little reason to accept that this is a live
possibility, since the only way this alternative picture could be correct
is if the folk were able to systematically identify the right facts as reasons
without thinking of them as playing an explanatory role, where the right
facts happen to be those that would also be independently identiﬁed
as explanations by philosophers, and we have yet to be told by what
means the folk are able to do this (though until we are provided with
a version of the second view. It is also quite common to think of reasons as right-makers (or
wrong-makers). ‘Right-maker’ is a term of art: it can either refer to one side of some kind of
explanatory relation, in which case the criticism above applies (unless one also accepts reasons
as evidence), or to one side of some kind of metaphysical relation—a constitution relation. I
can not do justice to the second option here, but my concern with it would be partly
metaphysical and partly epistemological: how are we to understand the constitution relation
in question, and how do right-makers, on this understanding, admit of both derivative and
ultimate kinds (keeping ﬁxed the desideratum that right-makers of the derivative kind come
ﬁrst in the order of discovery)?
8 Michael Ridge responded to the criticism in this way when I raised it at the Seventh
Annual Metaethics Workshop.
86 Daniel Stara plausible story as to how this could occur, such a strong correlation
seems miraculous).
Suppose that I am right that reasons as evidence is the best account of
reasons to place at the heart of a two-level approach to understanding
reasons. It might be objected that this is neither here nor there, because
all this talk of there being two levels of reasons—one for the ordinary
virtuous person and one for the philosopher—already hopelessly clashes
with the non-philosophical commitments of ordinary moral agents;
ordinary agents will wish to deny that there is a deeper explanation of
our moral reasons waiting to be provided. Contrary to what some have
claimed,
9 I do not believe common-sense morality contains any such
commitment to there being no deeper philosophical explanations of
moral truths.
I agree that common-sense morality would have us save many of the
appearances, and thus might well be thought to conﬂict with some moral
theories (act-utilitarianism, for example). However, this claim should
not be confused with the claim that common-sense morality rules out
the possibility that deeper explanations of moral truths might be
provided. On the contrary, I think the folk are committed to thinking
of the ordinary, virtuous person as being epistemically modest about
many moral truths (including any possible fundamental principle of
morality); and if I came to think I was wrong about this being some-
thing the folk are committed to, I would instead say that immodest
commitments are not worth saving.
An analogy may be helpful here: a general ontological theory in
metaphysics that would have it that all that exists are quantum particles
or forces would clash with common-sense ontological commitments.
However, there is no reason to think that such commitments would
conﬂict with a general ontological theory that would have it that the
most fundamental constituents of reality are quantum particles or
forces, and that would also contend that it is a useful and important
project to attempt to establish how it is that the objects we are ordinarily
more aware of (chairs, people, and so on) manage to exist in ways that
are grounded in such fundamental facts.
9 See Nick Zangwill’s paper in the present volume.
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I believe that a satisfactory account of virtue needs to meet three
desiderata: (1) The acts that the virtuous typically perform are taken to
be appropriate responses to facts that ultimately explain the rightness of
the acts themselves (they explain, for each right act they perform, why
they ought to perform this act); (2) It is admitted that the virtuous can
be, and often are, ignorant of such ultimate explanations, and the facts
on which such explanations depend (at the very least, they can be
ignorant that these facts are reasons); and (3) The virtuous always act
for genuine normative reasons (that is, they are responding to normative
reasons when they act). The second and third desiderata correspond to
two of the three claims that constituted our initial apparently inconsist-
ent triad. The ﬁrst desideratum adds something quite new and distinct-
ive: it asks us to think of the virtuous as responding, in some relevant
sense, to ultimate right-makers (and wrong-makers), and not just think
of the virtuous as responding to derivative reasons. It might seem that it
is difﬁcult to develop an account of virtue that meets all three desiderata,
just as it might have initially seemed difﬁcult to avoid inconsistency
without denying any of the three highly plausible claims with which we
began.
Here is a summary of the account of virtue that I think best meets
these desiderata, and is also attractive in its own right. Rather than
follow neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists such as Rosalind Hursthouse
(1999), who construe virtuous agents as morally omniscient (whenever
the relevant non-moral knowledge is in place and there is a determinate
answer to the question ‘what ought to be done?’), we should think of
them as agents who track and respond reasonably well to pro tanto
derivative reasons, guided by knowledge of what is normally right and
wrong. They must also possess knowledge of what they always ought
(not) to do, all things considered, in a large range of paradigmatic cases
(for example, one always ought to help people in need when this
imposes no signiﬁcant cost on anyone, and it is always wrong to torture
people merely for fun). We should think of virtuous agents as being very
skilled at weighing up (derivative) reasons, but also as often lacking
knowledge of true normative principles that would allow them to work
out what they ought to do in very difﬁcult cases, where the reasons they
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the virtue of normative modesty—that is to say, when we think carefully
about ordinary virtue, we see that the virtuous do not take themselves to
have all the answers to moral questions (to do so would be a vice).
It is very tempting to think that in difﬁcult cases, the virtuous could
beneﬁt from the provision of an ethical theory that speciﬁes universal
criteria for all-things-considered rightness and wrongness (tells them
what they ought and ought not do), but also that their inability to bring
to mind or justiﬁably endorse such a theory does not detract from their
virtue. After all, to be virtuous one need not be maximally virtuous.
This account—which is admittedly rather sketchy—meets the speci-
ﬁed desiderata. Notice, in particular, how desideratum (1) is met since,
on this account of virtue, the virtuous respond to derivative reasons, and
the analysis of reasons that was provided above connects both derivative
and ultimate reasons directly to ought facts. One can respond to
ultimate reasons indirectly, via derivative reasons, while acting in the
same way that one would act if responding to ultimate reasons
directly.
10 To return to the earlier example: I can respond to the fact
that an act would cause someone pain indirectly by responding directly
to the fact that the act would be a lie, without for a moment taking into
account the fact that it would cause pain.
11 Furthermore, my response
10 WhenMackie (1977)presents the famous argumentfrom relativity(now often called‘the
argument from disagreement’), he also presents a ‘well-known counter to this argument’
(p. 37). His argument depends on ﬁrst recognizing that there are many moral disagreements
between people of different groups, and then accepting that the best explanation of this
disagreement is that differences in moral codes are caused by differences in ways of life, and
not the other way around. The counter to the argument that he considers is that there may be
some principles which are recognized in all societies, and that many of the variations we see in
moral codes are due to differing applications of these principles to differing circumstances. His
reply to this objection is that ‘people judge that some things are good or right, and others are
bad or wrong, not because—or at any rate not only because—they exemplify some general
principle for which widespread implicit acceptance could be claimed, but because something
about those things arouses certain responses immediately in them, though they would arouse
radically and irresolvably different responses in others...the argument from relativity [thus]
remains in full force’ (pp. 37–8). The present approach to normative reasons and virtue
provides a way of responding to this reply: ordinary virtuous people may not be directly
aware of the deep principles that specify the features that always make certain acts right and
certain acts wrong, but they may be responding to these features anyway, via responding to
evidence concerning what they ought to do.
11 Remember that this is meant to be a toy example. If the example seems like one where it
would be easy for a virtuous person to actually directly attend to the ultimate reason in play,
bear in mind that there are good reasons to think that the correct normative ethical theory will
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whether I was well-placed to focus on facts about lying, or facts about
pain, as reasons. Touse a more positive example: I mighttake my reason
to cheer you up when you are worried to be the fact that you are worried
(this is what I think to myself), but it could be that by directly
responding to the fact that you are worried I am indirectly, and
appropriately, responding to the fact that you are in pain (or responding
to the fact that your rational autonomy is being undermined, say).
Here is an objection to the preceding account of virtue: suppose Joe
happens to believe that facts about the relative positions of stars in the
Milky Way are evidence concerning what he ought to do—not just in
relation to particular decisions he needs to make as a scientist in an
observatory (for there are non-bizarre ways that the positions of stars
could count as reasons for action), but, quite bizarrely, in relation to all
of his moral decisions. Furthermore, just suppose that, even more
bizarrely (through some huge cosmic coincidence), these facts really
are reliable evidence concerning what Joe ought to do whenever he
makes any kind of practical decision whatsoever. Now, notice how it
seems quite incredible to think that Joe could count as a morally
virtuous agent because he reliably tracks and responds to such facts
when making practical decisions.
12Althoughthismay initiallyseem like
a good objection, I believe it falls apart as soon as one clearly distin-
guishes between two versions of the imagined scenario: Joe may have
formed his beliefs about what is and is not evidence concerning what he
ought to do in either an epistemically irresponsible or epistemically
responsible fashion. If he formed his beliefs about the relevant evidence
in an epistemically irresponsible fashion (which seems much easier to
imagine than the alternative), then we should not think he is virtuous at
all. To be sure, I did not previously mention this, as a condition for
possessing moral virtue, but it now seems we need to add this condition
to our account of virtue, and I do not see any reason why we should
actually posit quite sophisticated facts when it comes to ultimate reasons. Perhaps the fact that
an act would respect rational autonomy would be a good candidate for an ultimate reason that
would better make the point here (since it is plausible that ordinary virtuous agents do not
think thoughts about rational autonomy, but rather focus on considerations to do with
honesty, kindness, courage, and so on).
12 I am grateful to Howard Nye for raising this objection at the First Annual Arizona
Workshop in Normative Ethics.
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13 On the other hand, if Joe somehow managed to form his beliefs
about the relevant evidence in an epistemically responsible fashion, then
I think we would properly view him as morally virtuous.
At this point I am in a position to provide a summary statement of
the new two-level account of moral thinking. On a ﬁrst level, moral
thinking involves the collection and weighing up of basic forms of
evidence concerning what one ought to do—an appreciation of and
an ability to weigh derivative reasons. It seems that most of us already
possess such evidence (or are close to possessing it), and may also possess
certain virtues by responding well to certain types of evidence (such as
the evidence that we classify under ‘kindness’). On a second level, moral
thinking involves essentially philosophical thinking that moves from
paying attention to such evidence in a way that guides our actions to
thinking about it systematically in order to postulate and, ideally, come
to know ultimate explanations for the rightness or wrongness of particu-
lar acts, on this basis. Such thinking might also take us beyond minimal
virtue in enabling us to determine what we ought to do in hard cases,
where we previously only saw (derivative) reasons of roughly equal
weight.
5. moral particularism and cultural
variability in the virtues
Now that I have provided a way of resolving the apparent inconsistency
with which Ibegan, while not giving upon any of thethree mainclaims,
I will ﬁnish by suggesting that the proposed two-level framework may
have two additional attractive features. The accounts of virtue and
reasons that I sketched above seem better placed than other accounts
on offer when it comes to explaining some of the key intuitions that feed
particularists, as well as some of the key intuitions that lead people to be
tempted by moral relativism out of a desire to understand and appreci-
ate cross-cultural variation in the virtues.
13 In fact, I am happily heading in the direction of viewing most of the practical virtues as
partly reducible to epistemic virtues (partly reducible because they also have an affective
dimension). As I also mention below, I think enkrasia is one of the practical virtues that
cannot be understood in this reductive fashion.
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provide an explanation of many of the intuitions that motivate moral
particularists—an explanation which might, in fact, lead us away from
particularism. I am thinking, in particular, of the intuitions on which
Jonathan Dancy (2006) relies when he promotes the holism of reasons
thesis that he believes makes it is impossible to articulate interesting
moral principles. If we separate reasons into our two classes of derivative
and ultimate reasons, we may be in a good position to deny that there is
holism on the level of ultimate right-makers and wrong-makers. Deriva-
tive reasons may have an holistic structure—and to the extent that this is
so, particularists might be onto something important when it comes to
the deliberations of the virtuous—but the particularist may be confus-
ing intuitions that involve derivative reasons with the intuitions that we
can come to have about ultimate reasons. Ultimate reasons may have an
atomistic structure on the account I sketched above, since they always
count in favor, or always count against, particular acts.
14
Once again, it might help if we use an example. Very plausibly, there
is normally a reason not to lie, and on many individual occasions one
may correctly judge that there is a reason not to lie. Particularists like to
point out that it is also very plausible to suppose that one can correctly
judge that there is no reason not to lie when one is in a situation where
one is playing a game with friends that everyone knows requires lying in
order to win (to use one of Dancy’s favorite examples). Examples such
as this one are taken to be evidence in favor of the holism of reasons
thesis, since such examples seem to suggest that reasons are not generally
invariant—that they can change their ‘valency’ from situation to situ-
ation in a way that always depends on other features of particular
situations. Yet, on the present two-level account of reasons, the ultimate
wrong-making feature in cases where it is wrong to lie (such as disres-
pect of another’s rational faculties, or pain, or whatever features would
be cited in the correct ethical theory) can instead be thought of as being
14 I am ignoring a complication here. McKeever and Ridge (2006) have argued that it is
possible to reject particularism (about moral principles) while still maintaining that the
structure of reasons is holistic through and through. While this might be true, merely as
a point about the logical relations between the bare particularist position and the bare holist
position, I believe holism is, in fact, explanatorily redundant once one rejects particularism.
I discuss reasons for thinking this is so (that do not depend on reasons as evidence) in Star
(2007).
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to lie when playinga game, preciselybecause no ultimatewrong-making
feature is present in such a case.
This last point seems perfectly generalizable. However, one might
worry that since I claim that the virtuous do not need to be aware of
ultimate reasons, an adequate explanation of why an ordinary virtuous
agent might appropriately judge that there is no reason at all not to lie in
a situation that involves a game that requires lying to win should not
appeal to the absence of an ultimate reason. I think this worry can be
adequately responded to as follows. What ultimately explains why
there is no reason not to lie in the game case is the absence of an
ultimate reason not to lie, but what explains how the agent can judge
that he has no reason not to lie may be something quite different.
Assuming reasons are evidence (in the exact manner speciﬁed above),
we can explain ‘silencing’ on the level of derivative reasons by utilizing
the notion of an epistemic defeater. The ordinary agent ordinarily takes
the fact that an act will be a lie to be evidence that he ought not do it,
but in certain cases this evidence can be defeated by other evidence that
he possesses, such as strong evidence (or knowledge) that everybody has
agreed to have fun by lying within the boundaries of a game.
The new account of reasons can also provide an explanation for why
the strength of a derivative reason and the strength of an underlying
ultimate reason do not need to be added together in those cases where
an agent is aware of both reasons. One might worry that any highly
promiscuous account of reasons for action, such as reasons as evidence,
will lead to a counting problem, and perhaps then to an unattractive
solution to this problem that supposes that some reasons have no weight
at all (see McKeever and Ridge, 2006, pp. 132–3; and Star, 2007).
Fortunately, reasons as evidence can provide an explanation of why we
cannot always aggregate the strengths of reasons: some items of evidence
are independent, while some items of evidence are not independent.I ti s
not rational to simply add together the strength of two dependent
reasons (assuming one has evidence that they are not independent). In
becoming aware of ultimate reasons (through philosophical reﬂection,
recall), agents become aware that derivative reasons are not independent
of certain ultimate reasons. Although it is no easy task for epistemology
to explain how we make good judgments about when some evidence is
dependent on some other evidence, it is clear that we all do this very
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how we can do this in non-controversial cases involving reasons for
belief will also enable us to explain how we can do this when it comes to
reasons for action.
Finally, let me brieﬂy mention a way in which the new account of
virtue might be further developed and utilized to capture intuitions
concerning cultural variability and disagreement when it comes to the
virtues. Consider a recent attempt to provide disentangling, semi-
reductive analyses of thick virtue terms in terms of descriptive elements
and thin moral terms. Elstein and Hurka suggest that courage (for
example) can be analyzed in the following way: ‘“act x is courageous”
can be analyzed as something like “x is good, and x involves an agent’s
accepting harm for himself for the sake of goods greater than the evil of
that harm, where this property makes any act that has it good,” and
where...the second “good” is an embedded evaluation.’ (2009, 527).
They suggest that it might be the case that all thick virtue terms can be
analyzed into a core descriptive component, and a thin evaluative
component (reference to good is essential in the above analysis of
courage). An alternative type of semi-reductive analysis to the one that
Elstein and Hurka propose might start with the following thought:
perhaps individual virtue terms are best analyzed by reference to evi-
dence concerning what one ought to do (reasons for action) of various
types, where the type is picked out by the descriptive (non-normative)
component of the relevant thick virtue term.
By focusing on evidence, this way of analyzing particular virtue terms
might be well placed to capture intuitions about justiﬁable cultural
variability.
15 For example, courage may consist in acting in ways that
involve risking harm to oneself where there is evidence that one ought to
15 An alternative would be to simply accept the Elstein and Hurka proposal for analyzing
virtues, alongside reasons as evidence. In an earlier draft I claimed that Elstein and Hurka’s
proposal might not be as well-placed to explain cultural variability in the virtues as a version of
that proposal that incorporates reasons as evidence. Hurka subsequently convinced me that
there is no particular reason, for all I have said, to think that this is so; after all, he and Elstein
themselves discuss the fact that their analysis leaves space for a huge amount of disagreement
about which things are, in fact, good: for example, integrity ‘involves an agent sticking to
a signiﬁcantly good goal despite distractions and temptations’, but there will be much
disagreement as to which goals are really good to stick to (2009,p .526). I do not mean to
say at this stage that the alternative suggestion for a way to analyze virtues that I now favor is
better placed for explaining cultural variation in the virtues. It certainly seems very well placed.
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following: to say that an act x is courageous is to say that x involves the
agent risking harm to himself for reasons that the agent possesses, and
that he rationally judges to be stronger than reasons that the agent also
possesses not to risk such harm. Given reasons as evidence, this is
equivalent to claiming that to say that an act is courageous is to say
that x involves the agent risking harm to himself on the basis of evidence
that he ought to do so that the agent possesses, and that he rationally
judges to be stronger than the evidence that he ought not risk such
harm. This type of semi-reductive analysis is one that focuses on the
normative rather than the evaluative sphere. It seems a little simpler
than the Elstein and Hurka style of analysis—but that is not to say very
much. I must postpone any attempt to decide which is the better type of
analysis of virtue terms until a later occasion, and at this stage I simply
offer it as an interesting alternative.
The relevant concept for each individual virtue may have fairly
minimal content: on the present proposal, an act of mine can fall
under the extension of the concept of courage if it involves a response
to evidence concerning what Iought to dowhen it comes to confronting
dangers to myself. Since such items of evidence also constitute reasons
for action, individual virtues involve particular types of reasons for
action. The minimal descriptive component of any virtue term may
be all that uniﬁes that virtue across very different cultures—which may
be part of what explains why we still believe that certain acts are acts of
courage (or kindness, or loyalty, and so forth) in another society, and
why we think of courage (for example) as a trait that exists in other
societies despite signiﬁcant cultural differences. Considered as a charac-
ter trait, rather than as a way of describing actions, courage may be
understood as a ﬁxed disposition to act on a certain type of evidence
concerning what I ought to do (and, in the case of intellectual courage,
what I ought to believe).
What one is justiﬁed in taking the reasons of courage to be, and what
one is justiﬁed in taking to be appropriate responses to such reasons,
may very well be partly dependent on culturally speciﬁc practices. This
need not commit one to saying that cultural practices are the source of
evidence concerning what one ought to do; all one needs to commit
oneself to is the highly plausible thought that such practices block,
transmit, downplay, or foreground evidence. Some particular evidence
Two levels of moral thinking 95that one ought to act in a risky manner may come to be possessed in one
cultural context, but not in another, and similar things might be said for
all the other moral virtues.
16
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